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Article 6

The Warren Court and Living Constitutionalism
Alex Tobin*
Scholars and judges have described living constitutionalism as a theory with
no substance—simply a substitute for the political whims of judges. While not
disputing that politics and values play an important role in all interpretive theories,
this Article argues that living constitutionalism provides a robust framework for
understanding the Constitution and the role that values should play in
constitutional interpretation. The Warren Court’s application of living
constitutionalism addressed two major and, perhaps, conflicting questions: (1) how
do we include voices excluded during discussions at the country’s founding to make
the Constitution a legitimate dignity document that is more reflective of our current
society; and (2) how do we understand the Court’s role in protecting the rights of the
minority from the majority, and how do these rights evolve with the times? This
Article argues that the Warren Court operationalized living constitutionalist theory.
An examination of Warren Court decisions uncovers patterns and themes that can be
applied as an interpretive theory. Without this framework of living
constitutionalism, many of the great societal victories of the Warren Court, such as
desegregation, voting rights, criminal justice, and death penalty abolition for
juveniles, may not have happened. Further, with a new administration looking to
appoint judges with an interest in social justice, this paper can serve as a resource
for new judges looking to adopt an alternative theory to originalism. Thus, this
Article articulates a clear vision for how the Warren Court used living
constitutionalism, explains why the Warren Court’s approach was necessary, and
suggests that this theory could be adopted as an alternative to originalism.
INTRODUCTION
Justice Antonin Scalia exuded intellect and personality. Addressing the
University of Cincinnati,1 Justice Scalia spoke about the interpretive theory of
originalism—a constitutional theory that holds that constitutional meaning comes
from the intent of the Founding Fathers, the original understanding of the people at
the time of the founding, or the original construction of the Constitution.2 This
*

1
2

(Co) Editor-in-Chief of the Harvard Law & Policy Review. J.D. Candidate, 2022, Harvard Law School. I owe
a special thank you to Professor Nikolas Bowie for his feedback and guidance and Professor Michael
Klarman for his advice and archival support. I also wish to express gratitude for the mentorship given to
me by Professor Michael Spivey. Thank you to Professor Donald B. Tobin, Leigh Tobin, Anne Tobin, and
Sarah Sadlier for their love and support. Lastly, thank you to the editors of the Indiana Journal for Law
and Social Equality for their excellent assistance.
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 849 (1989).
See Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 645 (2013);
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation
and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 751, 753 (2009); Scalia, supra note 1, at 851–52; see,
e.g., Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 261 (2019) (“The
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speech was turned into an essay titled “Originalism: The Lesser Evil,”3 but the
essay was not conciliatory. Justice Scalia wrote with thunder, extolling the
advantages of originalism while downplaying its flaws.4 Despite his conviction,
Justice Scalia’s words carried with them a nonchalance that accompanies assured
victory. For him, originalism was destined to win because “[y]ou can’t beat
somebody with nobody.”5 Justice Scalia asserted that “[i]f the law is to make any
attempt at consistency and predictability, surely there must be general agreement
not only that judges reject one exegetical approach (originalism), but that they
adopt another. And it is hard to discern any emerging consensus among the
nonoriginalists as to what this might be.”6
One can almost hear the shallow murmurs of agreement by the attendees,
and if agreement cannot be heard, it can certainly be read. Professors Nelson Tebbe
and Robert Tsai, writing in 2010, suggested that “[l]iving constitutionalism is
difficult to define; it is often described simply in opposition to originalism.”7
Professors Martin H. Redish and Matthew B. Arnould argue that continual
affirmation—a form of living constitutionalism that this Article will refer to as
contemporary ratification—is a theory that “amounts more to a result-oriented
rhetorical device than a coherent theory of constitutional interpretation.”8 Justice
Stephen Breyer, a living constitutionalist Justice,9 wrote a book on interpretation
called Active Liberty.10 Professor James E. Ryan, discussing Justice Breyer’s
nonoriginalist interpretive theory, wrote that “[Justice Breyer’s] approach seems
quite abstract and at times only loosely connected to the text of the Constitution.”11
Recently, political scientist Calvin TerBeek proposed that living constitutionalism
gained its dominance not because of a robust and persuasive intellectual theory but
rather because it made progressive legal preferences “make constitutional sense.”12
TerBeek put this bluntly when he argued that “[d]uring the 1960s height of the
Warren Court, living constitutionalists praised its major decisions, but the lack of a

3
4

5
6
7
8

9

10
11

12

threshold question for all originalist methodologies concerns the original communicative content of the
words of the Constitution.”).
Scalia, supra note 1, at 849.
See, e.g., id. at 852 (“But in the past, nonoriginalist opinions have almost always had the decency to lie, or
at least to dissemble, about what they were doing—either ignoring strong evidence of original intent that
contradicted the minimal recited evidence of an original intent congenial to the court's desires, or else not
discussing original intent at all, speaking in terms of broad constitutional generalities with no pretense of
historical support.”); id. at 862–63.
Id. at 855.
Id.
Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 514 n.240 (2010).
Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the
Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1517 (2012).
See Andrea Seabrook, Justices Get Candid About the Constitution, NPR (Oct. 9, 2011, 12:58 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2011/10/09/141188564/a-matter-of-interpretation-justices-open-up.
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005).
James E. Ryan, Does It Take a Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty, and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623,
1654 (2006) (book review).
Calvin TerBeek, The Search for an Anchor: Living Constitutionalism from the Progressives to Trump, 46 L.
& SOC. INQUIRY 860, 884 (2021).
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forward-looking blueprint left them open to creditable conservative charges that
this theorizing was simply academic cover for politically desirable results.”13 To
many politicians, scholars, and judges, living constitutionalism, the idea that the
Constitution evolves with the values and contexts of contemporary society and the
preeminent nonoriginalist theory, was a meaningless phrase—a cover for judicial
intervention and lawmaking.14 To cut through conceptual differences and focus on
substance, Professor Lawrence B. Solum, an originalist, attempted to define living
constitutionalism.15 He discussed numerous variants and applications of both
originalism and living constitutionalism.16 Most of the living constitutionalist
theory Solum discusses was put forth by professors or legislators.17 The Warren
Court was mentioned twice and its contribution to living constitutionalism not
thoroughly explored.18
The Warren Court may be the preeminent example of a living
constitutionalist Supreme Court in United States history.19 The Warren Court did
not invent the idea of reading the Constitution as a living document.20 It did,
however, operationalize it as a mode of interpretation with relative success. While
there was no one approach that all the Justices would agree on, there are themes
and structures the Court embraced when engaging in interpretive theory. These are
themes of interpretation actively and consistently used during the Warren Court
era, not simply academic justifications offered by legal progressives after the fact.
Living constitutionalism should (1) interpret constitutional values and provisions,
(2) apply these values and provisions to modern contexts and meanings, and (3)
reflect a diverse America that was unable to take part in the founding project.
Living constitutionalism is not a rigid theory that perfectly guides a judge to the
one true answer. To suggest perfection would make living constitutionalism fall into
the same mistake as originalism. No judge can be free of their values, and any
theory purporting to interpret law completely objectively is hiding this key fact.21
13
14

15

16
17
18
19

20
21

Id. at 861.
See, e.g., J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR
INALIENABLE RIGHTS TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 19 (2012) (“Perhaps more than any other cosmic constitutional
theory, living constitutionalism, both in theory and in practice, has elevated judicial hubris over humility,
boldness over modesty, and intervention over restraint.”); see generally Antonin Scalia, Common Law
Courts in a Civil Law System, TANNER LECTURE ON HUMAN VALUES 46 (1995) (suggesting that living
constitutionalism allows justices to decide for themselves, under no standard, when the Constitution
evolves).
See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the
Great Debate, 113 NW. U.L. REV. 1243, 1261 (2019).
See id.
See id. at 1260–61.
See generally id.
See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 5, 8–9
(1993) (describing how the Warren Court “was the basis for” and “sprouted” the themes of living
constitutionalism).
See id. at 6.
Living constitutionalists generally admit that the values of judges play an inevitable role in all
interpretation; the real question concerns what those values are and what is the appropriate level of
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The work living constitutionalism does is not proscriptive: conservative and
progressives justices alike could use the theory and come to two completely different
answers. Rather, living constitutionalism works as a structure for approaching the
law, understanding the Constitution as a dignity document, addressing the dead
hand problem, and making our republic operate within the contemporary world it
finds itself in. It is a theory that has been doing work in this regard for centuries.22
This Article argues that an understanding of how the Warren Court utilized living
constitutionalism will allow new judges and scholars to develop an alternative to
originalism. Further, by examining how living constitutionalism works, we begin to
understand how necessary living constitutionalism is and how without it the Court
would have struggled to recognize some of the fundamental rights that it did. The
Warren Court was the Court of Brown v. Board of Education,23 the sit-in cases,24
“one person, one vote,”25 and criminal justice.26 And even in areas where the Court
played a complimentary role, the Court encouraged other institutions to expand
rights.27
I. THE INTERPRETIVE BEGINNING: THE WARREN COURT AND BROWN
Segregation and the movement to eliminate it defined the Warren Court.
While the Thirteenth Amendment ended the wide practice of slavery, racial
segregation persisted in schools, public facilities, restaurants, shops, buses, and
other facets of society.28 The separate but equal doctrine—found permissible by the
Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson29—inherently and systematically
discriminated against Black people. Potential federal legislative fixes were
complicated: in the Civil Rights Cases decided in the late nineteenth century,
federal attempts to regulate discriminatory practices of private organizations were

22

23
24

25
26
27
28

29

judicial review. See generally Eric J. Segall, The Concession That Dooms Originalism: A Response to
Professor Lawrence Solum, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 33 (2020) (analyzing the role value judgments
play in both living constitutionalism and originalism). For an analysis on implicit judicial biases; see
generally Catie Wheatley, Honesty is the Best Policy: Addressing Implicit Bias in the Judiciary, 9 IND. J.L.
& SOC. EQUAL. 94 (2021).
See, e.g., TerBeek, supra note 12, at 860–63 (describing the history of living constitutionalism); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (“This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages
to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the
means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to change,
entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code.”).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
McKenzie Webster, The Warren Court’s Struggle With the Sit-In Cases and the Constitutionality of
Segregation in Places of Public Accommodations, 17 J.L. & POL. 373, 373–76, 406–07 (2001).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1963).
See A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 (1968).
See, e.g., WILKINSON, supra note 14, at 17.
See Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 10 THE SUPREME COURT REV. 59,
62 –63 (2010).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896).
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cast aside as unconstitutional.30 During the mid-twentieth century, there was little
appetite in Congress to redress any form of segregation.31 Southern senators were
able to block most civil rights legislation and continued to be reelected because of
their opposition.32 As for the states, many of them were even more racist. The
segregation laws themselves had been passed by the states as part of a larger
strategy to uphold white supremacy.33 Southern states continued to hold separate
but equal as fundamental constitutional law. When a Kansas resident, Oliver
Brown, attempted to enroll his child in a white school but was rejected because of
segregation, the case, along with other similar cases that were consolidated with
Brown, made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.34 The question before the Court
concerned challenging long-standing Court precedent and even longer-standing
cultural rage.35
Justice Felix Frankfurter was rarely of two minds. Born in Vienna, Austria,
to Jewish parents, Justice Frankfurter arrived in the United States in 1894 at the
age of twelve.36 He received top grades from Harvard Law School and was a
member of the Harvard Law Review.37 He became politically involved and
advocated for labor rights, civil liberties, and the Zionist movement of the early
twentieth century.38 Justice Frankfurter helped start the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) and held all the general bona fides and beliefs attributable to most
30

31

32

33

34
35
36

37

38

See Marianne L. Engelman Lado, A Question of Justice: African-American Legal Perspectives on the 1883
Civil Rights Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1123, 1126 (1995). The Civil Rights Cases consisted of five cases
that looked to challenge the Civil Rights Act of 1875. These five cases were consolidated for Supreme Court
argument. United States v. Stanley (The Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
See Anthony Badger, The South Confronts the Court: The Southern Manifesto of 1956, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 126,
138 (2008); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 366–67 (2007)
Without Brown, Congress most likely would not have enacted civil rights legislation when it
did. No such bill had been passed since 1875, and since the 1920s many proposed measures
had succumbed to the threat or reality of Senate filibuster. After Brown raised the salience of
race, many northerners—white and black—demanded civil rights legislation. Liberals in both
parties endorsed the concept as the 1956 elections approached.
See, e.g., KEITH M. FINLEY, DELAYING THE DREAM: SOUTHERN SENATORS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CIVIL RIGHTS,
126 (2008); Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, & Daniel Kryder, Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in
Congress, 1933-1950, 108 POL. SCI, Q. 283, 285 (1993) (“Liberal initiatives, in short, could not pass without
southern congressional support.”). See generally EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE
SOUTH 201 (1987) (describing the political conditions in the South that lead to the reelection of
segregationist senators).
See, e.g., Reginald Oh, Interracial Marriage in the Shadows of Jim Crow: Racial Segregation as a System of
Racial and Gender Subordination, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1321, 1337 (2006) (“[T]he California state
legislature passed a law which prohibited racial minority groups from attending school with white children.
A California newspaper printed an editorial piece supporting the segregation law, praising the law’s ability
to ‘keep our public schools free from the intrusion of the inferior races.’” (citations omitted)).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See id. at 488.
See Nomi M. Stolzenberg, Un-Covering the Tradition of Jewish “Dissimilation”: Frankfurter, Bickel, and
Cover on Judicial Review, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 809, 819–821 (1994).
See James R. Belpedio, Felix Frankfurter, FIRST AM. ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009) https://www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/1330/felix-frankfurter.
See Benjamin Akzin, Felix Frankfurter—In Memoriam, 2 ISR. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (1967).
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liberals growing up in the New Deal Era.39 In the courtroom, Justice Frankfurter
advocated for judicial restraint—the idea that judges should leave most issues to
the legislature and decide the cases they do take narrowly.40 Liberals from the
Lochner and New Deal eras, like Justice Frankfurter, could easily recall the
aggressively conservative Supreme Court striking down liberal legislation and
believed such overreach was antidemocratic.41
Once he was on the Supreme Court, Justice Frankfurter was quick to talk—
occasionally condescendingly—about the law to colleagues. There are many
examples of Justice Frankfurter “terribly misread[ing]” situations with other
justices.42 Justice Frankfurter once told fellow Justice Stanley Reed that he had
taught Harvard Law School students to read statutes multiple times and that Reed
should follow that advice as well.43 To some, Justice Frankfurter had an incredible
mind with a unique appreciation for government and liberty.44 To others, he was
always seconds away from tripping into a lecture: the cloakroom was his classroom,
and the annoyed Justices were his students.45
Yet, as Justice Frankfurter mulled over the case of Brown, the great minds of
the Court did not know what to think.46 The old liberal training required the Court
to move slowly and with Congress. Brown was a potentially unparalleled move by
the Court where it would mandate broad and sweeping social change, far ahead of
the legislature.47 Justice Frankfurter himself was a supporter of civil rights.48 His
personal views on race and rights were ahead of his time, and he was a supporter of
desegregation.49 However, Justice Frankfurter was an avid institutionalist.50 He
cared deeply about the Court and wished to preserve its legitimacy. He had judicial
39

40

41

42

43
44

45
46

47
48
49

50

See John Fox, Biographies of the Robes, THIRTEEN (PBS affiliate)
https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/robes_frankfurter.html.
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 120 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Both liberals and conservatives
have throughout history shifted between advocating for judicial restraint and supporting judicial review.
See Jack M. Balkin, Why Liberals and Conservatives Flipped on Judicial Restraint: Judicial Review in the
Cycles of Constitutional Time, 98 TEX. L. REV. 215, 215 (2019).
See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70, UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (2003) (describing liberal
policies that the Supreme Court struck down).
Melvin I. Urofsky, William O. Douglas and Felix Frankfurter: Ideology and Personality on the Supreme
Court, 24 HIST. TCHR. 7, 8 (1990).
Id. at 9.
See Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence and the Good Society: Shades of Felix Frankfurter and
the Harvard Hit Parade of the 1950s, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1799–1800 (1990) (describing the influence
Frankfurter had in shaping judicial restraint on students).
See Urofsky, supra note 42, at 8.
See Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., to the Conference (May 23, 1953) (discussing
possible questions to ask the lawyers, written just before the case was put to reargument).
Michael J. Klarman, Brown at 50, 90 VA. L. REV. 1613, 1618–19 (2004).
See id. at 1615.
See id (“Justice Frankfurter abhorred racial segregation, and his personal behavior clearly demonstrated
his egalitarian commitments.”).
See id. at 68; Tom C. Clark, My Brother Frankfurter, 51 VA. L. REV. 549, 549–51 (1965); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Role of the Academic Commentator, 40 S. TEX. L.
REV. 943, 947–48 (1990).
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restraint on one hand, the soul of the country on the other, and no escape route to
get the Court out of deciding the case.51
It is appropriate that Justice William O. Douglas began his autobiography by
discussing Justice Frankfurter: their differences often defined the Warren Court.52
In personality and judicial philosophy, Justices Douglas and Frankfurter were
opposites.53 Justice Douglas served on the Court from 1939 to 1975 and was the
author of many Warren Court opinions.54 As one scholar put it, Justice Douglas was
a person “whom one would never nominate for a pleasing personality award.”55
Justice Douglas would get bored during Frankfurter’s long cloakroom lectures and
leave the table in favor of the sofa.56 He would torment Justice Frankfurter by
making little comments and digs incessantly.57 The attacks were often personal,
and they were examples of Justice Douglas’s view that Justice Frankfurter had
“deep inside him a feeling of inadequacy.”58 It is important to note that the rivalry
was not one sided. Justice Frankfurter called Justice Douglas “evil,”59 treated
Justice Douglas as a simpleton or a political hack,60 and lambasted Justice Douglas
for his belief in an active judiciary.61 Justice Douglas represented the new left: keen
to seek progressive victories through litigation.62 As much as Justice Frankfurter
saw Brown as an impending threat to the Court’s credibility, Justice Douglas saw it
as an opportunity.
In 1952, Chief Justice Vinson led the Court as the justices heard oral
argument in Brown for the first time.63 Desegregation had four votes: Justices
William Douglas, Hugo Black, Harold Burton, and Sherman Minton.64 Segregation
had three votes with Justices Stanley Reed, Tom Clark, and Chief Justice Vinson.65
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter remained as swing votes, both frozen in place by
51

52
53

54
55
56
57
58
59
60

62

63
64
65

See Felix Frankfurter, Unpublished Draft from the Frankfurter Papers (1954) (“[I]t is not our duty to
express our personal attitudes toward these issues however deep our individual convictions may be. The
opposite is true.”).
See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1937–1975, at 7–8 (1980).
See Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas and the Clash of
Personalities and Philosophies on the United States, 1988 DUKE L.J. 71, 113 (1988).
See Michael I. Sovern, Mr. Justice Douglas, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 342, 345–46 (1974).
Urofsky, supra note 42, at 9.
Id.
See id.
DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 23.
Urofsky, supra note 42, at 9.
See H. N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 45, 128 (1981).
61Urofsky, supra note 42, at 10.
Justice Frankfurter and his followers continued to advance the idea of living
constitutionalism as a theory of judicial restraint. Eventually, however, legal
intellectuals allied with the New Deal/Civil Rights regime began to employ the idea of a
living Constitution in a different way. Now living constitutionalism became an argument
for active judicial protection of civil rights and civil liberties.
See Balkin, supra note 40, at 246
See Klarman, supra note 47, at 1613.
Id.
Id.
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a swirling cocktail of judicial norms, societal values, and personal beliefs.66 It
appeared that desegregation did not have the required five votes. Frankfurter
wanted more time to build a consensus within the Court and was able to maneuver
the case into reargument the next year.67 A year made all the difference. In the
intervening year, Chief Justice Vinson died of a heart attack, and Chief Justice Earl
Warren was appointed to the Court.68 The desegregation bloc had its fifth vote,69
and the Warren Court was born.
While there were now five votes for desegregation, almost all the members of
the Court wished for a unanimous decision.70 With five votes came nine, although
Justice Reed was briefly a holdout.71 The matter of judicial interpretation, however,
was less settled. Justice Frankfurter strived to unearth the intent and meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment.72 Justice Douglas’s conference notes show Justice
Frankfurter suggested that legislation passed by Congress assumed that
segregation was valid.73 Justice Jackson wrote a memorandum that was a
lackluster, almost embarrassed defense of Brown.74 This prompted a response from
one of his clerks who wrote candidly, “[i]f segregation is no longer legal, of course
the country will not tolerate it -- that would be a much better tone in your opinion. .
. . How can you expect them to be convinced if you are not yourself?”75 Ultimately,
Chief Justice Warren wrote the opinion of the unanimous Court and did so using
living constitutionalism.76

66

67

68

69
70

71
72

73
74
75

76

See William O. Douglas, Unpublished Brown Conference Notes (Dec. 13, 1952) (on file with Douglas
Papers); Tom Clark, Unpublished Brown Conference Notes, (1952) (on file at Tarton Law Library,
University of Texas, Box 27A); Klarman, supra note 47, at 1616.
See Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1867, 1873, 1906 (1991); KLARMAN, supra note 31, at 67.
In September of 1953, just before Brown was to be reargued, Vinson died of a heart attack,
and everything changed… President Eisenhower replaced Vinson with Earl
Warren…Through a combination of determination, compromise, charm, and intense work
with the other justices… Warren engineered something that might have seemed
impossible the year before: a unanimous opinion overruling Plessy.
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/03/did-brown-matter.
See Cass Sunstein, Did Brown Matter?, THE NEW YORKER (2004)
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954).
See Memorandum from William O. Douglas, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct. (May 17, 1954); Letter from Felix
Frankfurter, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., to Grenny Clark, Att’y (Apr. 15, 1957) (on file with author) (explaining
that it was not Chief Justice Warren alone that created a unanimous Court).
See Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 67, at 1907.
See Letter from Alexander Bickel, L. Clerk, U.S. Sup. Ct., to Felix Frankfurter, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct. (Aug.
22, 1953) (on file with author); Klarman, supra note 47, at 1615; cf. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of
Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83, 97 (2010) (“Brown vividly illustrates that history cannot always
resolve the problems of today, and in fact, too literal a quest for past intentions may be
counterproductive.”).
See Douglas, supra note 70.
Memorandum from Robert H. Jackson, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 15, 1954).
Letter from E. Barrett Prettyman Jr., L. Clerk, U.S. Sup. Ct., , to Robert H. Jackson, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct.
(on file with Library of Congress Box 184) (emphasis in original).
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954); GEOFFREY R. STONE & DAVID A. STRAUSS,
DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY: THE ENDURING CONSTITUTIONAL VISION OF THE WARREN COURT 21–22 (2020).
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The Court declared that it could not “turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”77
It continued by saying,“[w]e must consider public education in light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in
this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these
plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.”78 In full transparency and with
adequate vigor, the Court established that it was going to look at the context of
American life, the place education has in the contemporary period, and modern
understandings and values.79
Further, the Court reiterated that this approach is the only way to interpret
the law on this issue.80 The writers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not anticipate
that they were banning segregation.81 In fact, far from being a help to Brown, early
forms of originalism were manifested with the purpose of defeating Brown.82 We
might expect an originalist Court to prioritize the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment writers over the dignity of education in modern society. Professor
Frank B. Cross noted that “[v]arious commentators have agreed that originalism
could not support the outcome, and there is a widespread belief that the decision
was inconsistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.”83
The Warren Court itself looked into the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and found it, in the nicest light, inconclusive. Living constitutionalism,
however, is less bound by the specific intent of the writers and more persuaded by
context, constitutional themes, and contemporary understandings. It is living
constitutionalism that allows the Brown Court to assess the role race and education
play in modern society.84 Professor Morton J. Horwitz wrote on living
constitutionalism and Brown that, “[o]ut of this seed in Brown v. Board of
Education there sprouted, during the Warren Court’s tenure, a very powerful view
held among several of the Justices that constitutions cannot be static, but are
designed to change.”85 Yet, while the Warren Court understood living
constitutionalism as necessary, it was unclear how to operationalize and use it in a
way that acknowledges subjectivity, judicial values, lived experiences, and judicial
bias without reducing living constitutionalism to purely politics by another name.
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How and why does living constitutionalism allow the Court to look at education and
modern society? Brown was a short opinion and did not expand vigorously on living
constitutionalism. It would set the tone, however, for the entire Warren Court, both
in legacy and substance.
And what of the balance between contemporary values and the Court’s role
as a counter-majoritarian force? Justice Douglas wrote a memo in 1960 reflecting on
the Brown decision.86 He recalled that Justice Frankfurter got heated in conference,
saying that if Justice Douglas got his way, the segregation cases would have arrived
at the Court too soon.87 Justice Frankfurter could not have ruled against it because
“public opinion had not then crystallized against it.”88 With Chief Justice Warren,
Justice Frankfurter maintained that public opinion had since changed, and thus it
was good that the Court had waited.89 Justice Douglas quoted Justice Brennan as
responding: “‘God almighty.’”90
II. IT’S ALIVE! JUSTICE BRENNAN, LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND
CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION
Brown is instructive, as it demonstrates the beginning of living
constitutionalism in the Warren Court; living constitutionalism was a burgeoning
idea without full development. Justice William Brennan Jr.’s 1986 article, The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,91 provides a more
comprehensive view of the Court’s theory in retrospect. Earl Warren was the Chief
Justice, but many have suggested the Court could have been named the Brennan
Court.92 Chief Justice Warren frequently assigned important opinions to Justice
Brennan and considered him to be the “most capable lieutenant.”93 Justice Scalia, a
Justice who is often compared with Justice Brennan in their respective roles,94 said
that Justice Brennan was “probably the most influential justice of the century.”95
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Appointed in 1956 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower,96 Justice Brennan arrived
at the Court with considerable import. Justice Brennan graduated from Wharton
School of Business and Harvard Law School,97 served in the military,98 and
eventually made his way to the New Jersey Supreme Court.99 Once on the United
States Supreme Court, he wasted little time in becoming the intellectual leader of
the Court’s progressive wing.
Justice Brennan advocated for an interpretive theory called contemporary
ratification. In 1985, he looked back at his time on the Court and wrote a defense of
his theory in his article on contemporary ratification.100 His article not only
highlighted his interpretive approach, but it also tied together numerous
interpretive strategies used by the Warren Court.101 Justice Brennan understood
the Constitution as a document that is about dignity and the rights of all people.102
He acknowledged that we have not lived up to this purpose in all ways, but wrote
that “we are an aspiring people, a people with faith in progress.”103 It is with this
understanding—that the Constitution is concerned with human dignity and
progress—that Justice Brennan began his analysis.
The Constitution is vague; its text is “broad and the limitations of its
provisions are not clearly marked,”104 giving rise to the need for interpretation. This
interpretation is not a private affair; interpretation cannot be a “haven for private
moral reflection.”105 Rather, interpretation is “inescapably public.”106 By this,
Justice Brennan meant that the interpretation of the Court is open to critical
scrutiny and done in the public context. The Court resolves public controversies by
interpreting a public text, often on public issues with surrounding controversy.
Justice Brennan did not spend too much time expanding on the ramifications of this
assertion.107 His assertion likely suggests two things: (1) that judges should not
“hide the ball” of interpretive theory and (2) that there is some level of public
accountability for Court decisions.
In addition to the public character of the Court’s constitutional analysis,
Justice Brennan was interested in the finality of Supreme Court decisions on
constitutional law.108 Such decisions hold the force of law and power of the State.
96
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The Court cannot avoid ruling on important social, economic, and political matters,
and a justice’s role in a decision is often obligatory. Justice Brennan wrote that,
“[t]hese three defining characteristics of my relation to the constitutional text––its
public nature, obligatory character, and consequentialist aspect––––cannot help but
influence the way I read that text.”109 Yet, Justice Brennan’s interpretation is not
about his conscience but that of the community. He understood that it is the
“community’s interpretation that is sought.”110 This is not to say that there is one
singular interpretation that the community supports. Rather, Justice Brennan
theorized that interpretation could neither be based on his personal political
preferences, nor the personal preferences of founders long gone.111 Community
interpretation required legitimacy of interpretation within a free society. The Court
had to reconcile self-government with the need to invalidate the people’s laws for
violating a higher law, the Constitution.112
Justice Brennan acknowledged the rising tide of originalism. He criticized
originalism for “feign[ing] self-effacing deference” in the name of original intent.113
In reality, he claimed, it was “little more than arrogance cloaked as humility.”114
Justice Brennan asserted that finding the intent of the Founders is an impossible
exercise, with sources often conflicting.115 He argued that it is unclear whose intent
we should care about or whether the historical records could come up with anything
conclusive.116 More importantly, however, he attacked originalism not simply for its
flaws in practice but also in principle. Justice Brennan charged originalism as
having “political underpinnings” as it is slanted toward having a “passive approach”
to interpretation.117 For Justice Brennan, originalism established a presumption
against the claim of a constitutional right.118 This is a political decision because it
“expresses antipathy to claims of the minority rights against the majority.”119 Such
a theory ignores the “social progress and eschew[s] adaptation of overarching
principles to changes of social circumstance.”120 In critiquing originalism, Justice
Brennan’s living constitutionalism comes into focus. He theorized that
interpretation should not be blind to the values behind the Constitution’s words
(overarching principles).121 Further, it is the role of the Court to protect the
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Id.
Id.
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minority from the majority, and the Court’s interpretation should reflect this
understanding.122
Justice Brennan believed that an “[u]nabashed enshrinement” of the majority
would lead to the possibility of a social caste system.123 He argued that we cannot
expect the majority to look after minority rights.124 This approach is relevant to
Justice Brennan’s living constitutionalism because it is a response to one of
originalism’s major critiques of the theory: that living constitutionalism is
undemocratic because it takes important societal questions out of the political
realm.125 Justice Brennan was adamant that the Constitution’s text embodies social
value choices—choices that are partly outside the realm of the legislature and
subject to judicial review.126 The need for judicial review may be especially salient
when considering the period during which Justice Brennan sat on the Court.
Southern state legislatures attempted to protect white supremacy at every
opportunity.127 Racist southern senators could bring the national government to a
standstill on matters concerning racial progress.128 This context does not render
concerns over institutional capture129 a thing of the past. There continues to be
democratic imbalance in the institutions of today: gerrymandering, the makeup of
the Senate (Wyoming and California getting equal representation despite large
difference in population size), the electoral college, and legislative capture, among
other factors, suggest that these institutions are not perfect. When our—often
flawed—democracy collides with human dignity, democracy does not always win.
Just like there are times when the constitutional dignity is best judged by the
legislatures, so, too, there are times when the Court must choose dignity over
democracy because the purpose of the Constitution is to “declare certain values
transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities.”130
Having recognized the above values—that interpretation is public, that there
are serious consequences that flow from decisions, that values can be seen as
generalities, and that interpretation must be used to protect minority rights—we
come to Justice Brennan’s interpretive conclusion. He wrote:
But the ultimate question must be: What do the words of the text
mean in our time? . . . Interpretation must account for the
transformative purpose of the text. Our Constitution was not intended
to preserve a preexisting society but to make a new one, to put in place
122
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Id.
See id. at 435.
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(2018).
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new principles that the prior political community had not sufficiently
recognized. Thus, for example, when we interpret the Civil War
amendments—abolishing slavery, guaranteeing blacks equality under
law, and guaranteeing blacks the right to vote—we must remember
that those who put them in place had no desire to enshrine the status
quo. Their goal was to make over their world, to eliminate all vestige
of the slave caste.131
Contemporary ratification is the legitimization of this vision of the
Constitution: one where the Constitution was intended to evolve with the society it
governed. With every vote for president or city clerk, with every jury duty summons,
with every op-ed and every sit-in, we constantly amend and ratify our Constitution.
In fact, this is what gives the Constitution its legitimacy. Naturally, there is no one
alive today who was involved with the ratification process. Nor did we inherit a
democratic moment. Much of the population at the time of founding was unable to
have their voice heard, let alone vote.132 Many were enslaved.133 Thus, by
understanding that the Constitution is constantly evolving and being reratified by
every generation—in its image (its values, concerns, and positionalities)—we are
including those who were previously voiceless. We are making the Constitution
stronger by making it more workable and more democratic. Further, Justice
Brennan understood the Constitution as being a document of dignity. Justice
Brennan left us with the following passage:
As we adapt our institutions to the ever-changing conditions of
national and international life, those ideals of human dignity—liberty
and justice for all individuals—will continue to inspire and guide us
because they are entrenched in our Constitution. The Constitution
with its Bill of Rights thus has a bright future, as well as a glorious
past, for its spirit is inherent in the aspirations of our people.134
While Justice Brennan offered the Warren Court numerous ways to legitimize
living constitutionalism and a few things to consider in its interpretation, more
needs to be done to operationalize the theory. How do we know what the aspirations
of our people are? How do we know what dignity means? When do we know the
Constitution has been reratified in the new generation’s image? The Warren Court
grappled with these questions in a variety of ways: one of these was creating the
“evolving standards of decency” test.135
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III. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY—HOW TO KNOW WHEN SOCIETY HAS
MOVED ON
Chief Justice Warren’s influence on the Court was profound. Brown was not
an inevitable conclusion until Justice Warren arrived on the Court. Justice Warren
went on to author Brown,136 Reynolds v. Sims (one person, one vote),137 and Loving
v. Virginia (interracial marriage)138, among others.139 Justice Warren, the former
Governor of California turned Justice,140 was admired by his colleagues regardless
of their interpretive philosophy. Justice Abe Fortas wrote of Warren: “in presenting
the case and discussing the case, [Chief Justice Warren] proceeded immediately and
very calmly and graciously to the ultimate values involved—the ultimate
constitutional values, the ultimate human values.”141 While the “evolving standards
of decency” test coming out of the Chief Justice’s opinion in Trop v. Dulles concerned
only the Eighth Amendment,142 the test is representative of Chief Justice Warren’s
general interpretive theory. The test also highlights (1) how to turn Justice
Brennan’s contemporary ratification theory into a rule and (2) the consequences on
our jurisprudence were it not for living constitutionalism.
Trop v. Dulles asked the Court to interpret the Eighth Amendment and
decide whether the expatriation of a citizen convicted of wartime desertion was
cruel and unusual.143 The Court declared that the Eighth Amendment “must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”144 For the Court in Trop, this meant evaluating the harm done
by the punishment: the expatriated person effectively “lost the right to have
rights.”145 The Court looked to other “civilized nations” to find that “statelessness is
not . . . imposed as a punishment.”146 Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman v.
Georgia147 later expanded on this interpretation. When tasked with identifying
when new standards of decency had emerged, Justice Brennan highlighted the
existence of standards in other state jurisdictions as proof of new standards148 and
cited Trop.149 In doing so, Justice Brennan wrote that “[r]ejection by society, of
136
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course, is a strong indication that a severe punishment does not comport with
human dignity.”150 Justice Brennan went further to say that historical and modern
acceptance factor significantly in such determinations.151 In reading Chief Justice
Warren’s opinion in Trop and Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman together, a
process emerges. The Court cared about (1) the nature of the right taken away, (2)
the existence of the standard (form of punishment) in surrounding countries or
states, and (3) the trends and changes of the punishment in question (is death
penalty use going up or down?).152 No one factor is sufficient to determine the
evolving standard of decency. Rather, the Eighth Amendment “seriously implicated
several of the[se] principles, and it was the application of the principles in
combination that supported the judgment.”153
Justice Thurgood Marshall, an avid living constitutionalist,154 arrived at the
Court in 1967.155 Justice Marshall was a renowned lawyer; he successfully argued
Brown as Chief Counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund.156 He
was a judge on the Second Circuit and the United States Solicitor General before
becoming the first Black American to sit on the nation’s highest court.157 Justice
Marshall wrote a concurrence in Furman adding teeth to the “evolving standards of
decency” test. He believed that certain constitutional questions forever remain open,
ready to be interpreted by various “given moment[s].”158
Justices Marshall and Brennan both believed that certain punishments
involve so much pain and indignity that “civilized people cannot tolerate them.”159
Such penalties “shock[] the conscience and sense of justice of the people.”160 Justice
Marshall, however, suggested that the Constitution may prohibit such a
punishment regardless of public sentiment on a particular case.161 Public unanimity
on a particular case is not needed in order to find a punishment offensive to
contemporary society.162 Further, the standard for whether a society has evolved
does not rely on opinion polls. Justice Marshall wrote, it “is not whether a
substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital
punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light
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of all information presently available.”163 He also believed such information should
be contextualized. Justice Marshall observed that the death penalty is a tool of
white supremacy and an arm of racism, and racism should shock the conscience.164
Thus, the vague idea of contemporary ratification has been whittled into a workable
standard. The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that shocks the conscience
of our society and disregards the dignity of the afflicted individual. We can
determine whether a punishment shocks the conscience of our society by looking at
its use, the trend of its use in other jurisdictions, the nature of the right being
infringed upon, and the surrounding inequalities that give the punishment
context.165 We do not need to poll the citizenry but rather we adopt a standard
similar to that of a “reasonable person” standard: what would a citizen think if they
163
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165
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See Furman, 408 U.S. at 364–66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Leon Hanna, Note, Solitary Confinement as Per Se Unconstitutional, 21 J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 2 (2019). In
1988, the Court looked to professional consensus as another way of understanding the standard. See id. at
7. While the justices stressed that personal predilections should be ignored, the reality is that values
frequently play a role in all interpretive theories. Thus, the question of what makes a workable standard is
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judge’s predilections inevitably influence decision making. Justice John Paul Stevens, a justice that often
utilized living constitutionalism wrote on this topic in his dissent in McDonald v. Chicago, writing:
Justice Cardozo’s test undeniably requires judges to apply their own reasoned judgment, but
that does not mean it involves an exercise in abstract philosophy. . . . [H]istorical and
empirical data of various kinds ground the analysis. Textual commitments laid down
elsewhere in the Constitution, judicial precedents, English common law, legislative and social
facts, scientific and professional developments, practices of other civilized societies, and,
above all else, the ‘traditions and conscience of our people,’ are critical variables. They can
provide evidence about which rights really are vital to ordered liberty, as well as a spur to
judicial action.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 872 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted),
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knew all the facts? In this way, contemporary society speaks out against a law
passed by a majority in a legislature, often a law from a previous era or a renegade
state.166
This approach to living constitutionalism was applied by the Warren Court
for years. The Warren Court’s use of trends in state jurisdictions was prevalent in
criminal procedure cases such as Mapp v. Ohio. There, the Court commented on the
trends in state legislatures and judiciaries in adopting the exclusionary rule.167
There is little evidence that the Founders believed in an exclusionary rule,168 but
the changes in society—coupled with pragmatic necessities—demanded that the
exclusionary rule be part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment.169 There are also
themes of an evolving-need test in the voting rights cases of Baker v. Carr170 and
Reynolds.171
IV. THE PENUMBRA OF JUSTICE DOUGLAS
Justice Douglas’s living constitutionalism is harder to pinpoint. Little
scholarship is dedicated to his interpretive theory despite the fact that Justice
Douglas served on the Court for thirty-six years. Professor Ronald Dworkin offered
some analysis, noting that Justice Douglas often championed a theory of individual
rights that both preexisted the Constitution and that the Founders enshrined into
the Constitution.172 Dworkin too, however, appears to give up in searching for
immutable principles.173 This behavior is understandable as Justice Douglas largely
shunned such approaches.174 In many ways, Justice Douglas was a legal realist who
believed a large portion of all judicial opinions were centered around one’s “gut.”175
Despite professing to be against lawmaking through judicial whim (and
claiming that this was what the Burger Court was doing),176 Justice Douglas was
quick to find new liberties within the text of the Constitution. Justice Douglas found
rights for the poor, disadvantaged, and downtrodden in the name of the Founding
166
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Fathers for ideas that even modern society did not support, let alone the Founding
Era.177 While Justice Douglas called out the “balancing” of the “Frankfurter
school,”178 it was Justice Douglas himself who often engaged in judicial balancing.179
When reading Justice Douglas’s autobiography, one could easily conclude that he
was sympathetic to textualism and originalism.180 Yet, upon reading his conference
notes, few aspects of his approach mirror those he professed.181 Certainly, many of
the opinions he wrote or joined have received criticism from originalists.182 It would
seem that, on the surface, Justice Douglas was a man of interpretive contradiction.
He was born into the legal realist school only to say that his opinions did not reflect
his personal predilections.183 He was one of the greatest advocates for expanding
and innovating civil liberties, only to claim that these rights were not innovative at
all.184 Further, the Warren Court’s liberals loved judicial balancing and used it
frequently to the horror of Justice Harlan, Justice Frankfurter, and Chief Justice
Burger, even if Justice Douglas asserted otherwise.
Justice Douglas was an influential figure in the Warren Court’s living
constitutionalist jurisprudence. This seems at odds with the above analysis. In some
ways, the narrative of Douglas’s inconsistency is true: his interpretive theory in
practice does not perfectly align with the theory he professed to use. Justice Douglas
accused Justice Frankfurter of using judicial balancing while he (Justice Douglas)
just focused on the text.185 The opposite is likely more accurate. In fact, Douglas
contributed two major parts of the Warren Court’s living constitutionalism: (1) the
penumbras of rights186 and (2) interpretive scope.187 In doing so, he tied the
Founding Era to living constitutionalism and supplied a blueprint for how antioriginalists should think and interpret sources from the Founding Era.
177
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See id. at 52–53.
See id. at 48.
See, e.g., Mary M. Lay, Midwifery on Trial: Balancing Privacy Rights and Health Concerns After Roe v.
Wade, 89 Q. J. OF SPEECh 60, 63 (2003).
See DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 53.
See Douglas, supra note 70 (Douglas papers).
See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 37 (1999).
See C. Paul Rogers III, The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 895, 901
(2008) (writing that Douglas was a “product of the legal realist movement”); Dworkin, supra note 172, at
904 (describing how Douglas recognized judging as “inescapably subjective”); Urofsky, supra note 42, at
138.
See Kenneth L. Karst, Justice Douglas and the Equal Protection Clause, 51 IND. L.J. 14, 16–17 (1975);
DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 52–53.
DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 52–53.
This Article will analyze the penumbras theory as Justice Douglas’s. He wrote the chief case, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), that would become the fundamental penumbra case leading to Roe v.
Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In truth, however, it was Justice Brennan that suggested to Justice Douglas
that he adopt the penumbras theory of interpretation. Douglas originally wanted to write Griswold as a
freedom of association case. Letter from William J. Brennan, Jr., Just. of the Sup. Ct. of the U.S., to William
Douglas, Just. of the Sup. Ct. of the U.S. (Apr. 24, 1965) (on file with Professor Michael Klarman).
See Sovern, supra note 54, at 350 (“Douglas, in his more freewheeling style, found greater comfort and scope
in some of the broad generalized phrases of the Constitution.”).
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The Penumbras of Rights theory originated from Douglas’s opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut.188 The balancing act of the Warren Court—reconciling the
evolving nature of the Constitution with the need to be seen as nonpolitical—was
immediately on display. While recognizing that justices “do not sit as superlegislatures to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws,”189 Justice
Douglas ardently defended the need for living constitutionalism. He pointed out
that a number of rights currently enjoyed were not written into the Constitution or
the Bill of Rights, yet the First Amendment was construed to include them.190 To
defend this evolution of the First Amendment, Justice Douglas introduced the idea
of a penumbra of rights. Justice Douglas argued that certain constitutional
guarantees have penumbras that are “formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance.”191 Put another way, a plethora of rights
depending upon, encouraging, and defending privacy creates support for the idea
that privacy is a right in itself.192
Further, the recognition of a privacy right might be a necessary condition
that an enumerated right depends upon—an enumerated right being one
specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights. Textual provisions can give rise to
themes, and those themes are provisions in themselves.193 These rights are not
made up by the justices; rather, they are “created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees.”194 In defending the legitimacy of penumbras, Justice
Douglas cited the history and meaning of the Ninth Amendment.195 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Arthur Goldberg, in furtherance of unenumerated rights, cited
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Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483–85 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy.”).
Id. at 482.
Id.
Id. at 484.
Many have suggested the penumbras are just a modern form of “doing Lochner:” the idea that the Court
finds unenumerated rights to support deregulation (often with an insinuation that such rights were
recognized because of political preferences). See Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review:
Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 296 (1986); Eric Segall, Free Speech and Freedom of
Religion, 35 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 937, 948 (2019) (transcript from a live panel) (using the term doing Lochner).
Justice Douglas vehemently rejected this accusation. See id. at 481–82. Justice Douglas maintained he was
tied to the text and structure of the Constitution. DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 52–53. It is not that he was
taking some natural law principle out of thin air—rather, these were modern moral principles that
emanated from the Constitution. They are not imposing a particular economic system onto the Constitution.
They were derivable from its “logic” or “structure.” See Eugene McCarthy, In Defense of Griswold v.
Connecticut: Privacy, Originalism, and the Iceberg Theory of Omission, 54 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 335, 346
(2018). Justice Douglas would likely further argue that the Founders themselves were proponents of
natural law inferences deriving from the text. Id. at 347 (“The right to privacy, in other words, predates and
supersedes the written Constitution and Douglas believed that the drafters recognized this fact.”).
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–85.
Id. at 485. The view that privacy was essential to “ordered liberty” was shared by many justices including
the influential conservative Justice Harlan. JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION
HE MADE 453 (2007).
NEWTON, supra note 194, at 484.
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Snyder v. Massachusetts196 for its proposition that the Due Process Clause protects
liberties that are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.”197 Thus, we begin to see the application of living
constitutionalism. The conscience of people changes and evolves.
Further still, the fundamental values of our nature—such as liberty, dignity,
or justice—are understood with differing lenses. For the enumerated rights to work
in a changing and modern world, the penumbras must change with them in order to
create a functioning, governing document. In fact, it is often the unenumerated
penumbras that are driving the living constitutionalism in these instances. For
example, it was Justice Douglas’s penumbras of rights that led to the recognition of
privacy in Roe v. Wade,198 a decision, like Brown, fundamental for modern rights199
and yet at odds with the Founding Era.200
Justices Douglas and Goldberg elaborated on the penumbra of rights theory
in their Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States concurrences.201 Heart of
Atlanta upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964.202 Both Justices understood that the
purpose behind section two of the Act is about human dignity.203 This decision is
consistent with their interpretation of the purpose behind the Fourteenth
Amendment: “[T]he essence of many of the guarantees embodied in the Act are
those contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.”204 The Heart of Atlanta analysis
seems similar to what would later be coined as super-statute purposivism by
Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn.205 Instead of using super-statute
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934) (internal quotations omitted)).
198 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152–53 (1973); NEWTON, supra note 194, at 455 (“[Griswold] would become a
foundation for Roe v. Wade in 1973…”).
199 See, e.g., Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right—International and Regional
Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 251 (2008) (“In addition to the right to life and health, women’s right to
abortion is bolstered by the broad constellation of human rights that support it, such as rights to privacy,
liberty, physical integrity and non-discrimination. In fact, it is the evolution of human rights
interpretations and applications, stemmed by increased sophistication, women’s empowerment and
changing times, which have given force to women’s human right to abortion.”).
200 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT 291, 291 (2007) (suggesting that
criticism of Roe often includes that “there is no evidence that the framers and adopters of the 1987
Constitution or of any later amendments expected or intended the Constitution to protect a woman’s right
to abortion”); cf. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 297 (2007)
(“Many federal laws securing the environment, protecting workers and consumers—even central aspects of
Social Security—go beyond original expectations about federal power . . . .”); Daniel A. Farber, The
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO STATE L.J. 1085, 1093 (1989) (speaking to the intent
of the Fourteenth Amendment writers: “[I]t might be possible to establish with some degree of confidence,
for instance, that abortion was not considered a fundamental right in 1866 . . . .”).
201 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 283 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
291–93.
202 See id. at 242.
203 See Letter from William O. Douglas, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., to Arthur Goldberg, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 14,
1964) (on file with Douglas Papers Box 1347, Library of Congress).
204 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 283 (Douglas, J., concurring).
205 See Willian N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001)
(“Occasionally, super-statutes can reshape constitutional understandings.”).
196
197
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purposes to interpret the meaning of a statute, however, the Court used the theory
to understand the Constitution. The large themes of the statute are consistent with
the large themes of the Constitution.206 Put another way, the spirit in which the
Civil Rights Act was passed not only passes constitutional muster under the text of
the Constitution, but it also passes under the penumbras of rights theory. Justice
Douglas can be interpreted as believing that when looking at the intent of the
founders, we should look not at the literal intent but at the ethos of the measure—
what normative mischief it was trying to solve and what values were encompassed
in the solution. Thus, while the Fourteenth Amendment was about making Black
Americans equal under the law, it was also about a general push against white
supremacy and a general affirmation of Black peoples’ rights. On an even more
generalized level, the Amendment may have been about curbing hateful power and
protecting those who are oppressed. All generalities of the Amendment are valid
purposes of the Amendment; all three generalities were present in the ethos of the
Amendment writers' intent.207 Justice Douglas updated the Constitution by
changing the generality by which he read the text.
But who says what generality we should use when interpreting the
Constitution? Justice Douglas took a macroscopic view of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Others may take a microscopic approach and only look at the words
and their literal meanings. What makes Justice Douglas’s scope correct? Justice
Douglas would likely answer that he had not strayed from the text at all; rather, it
was Justice Frankfurter who changed the scope.208 Justice Douglas was just using
the scope the law requires.209 This answer seems unsatisfactory. Justice Douglas
may have thought of himself as a great historian of the Founding Era, but so too did
Justice Harlan, who often disagreed with Justice Douglas.210 Justice Douglas would
206
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208
209
210

See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 283 (Douglas, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole of
Constitutional Law, 89 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1049 (2014) (arguing that the writing of the Fourteenth
Amendment revolved around the rights of Black Americans and the want to curb white supremacy);
Marshall, supra note 13 (“While the Union survived the civil war, the Constitution did not. In its place
arose a new, more promising basis for justice and equality, the 14th Amendment.”); Nina Morais, Sex
Discrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment: Lost History, 97 YALE L.J. 1153, 1171 n. 76, n. 77 (1988)
(describing the previous general intent scholarship and suggesting a way that the Fourteenth Amendment
writers’ general intent may be used to fight sex discrimination cases).
Remember that Justice Brennan was also a proponent of reading the Constitution at a more general level
than the original mischief that inspired the text. He wrote a partial defense of this position in the Harvard
Law Review.
For the genius of our Constitution resides not in any static meaning that it had in a world
that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with the
problems of a developing America. A principle to be vital must be of wider application than
the mischief that gave it birth. Constitutions are not ephemeral documents, designed to
meet passing occasions. The future is their care, and therefore, in their application, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.
See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV
489, 495 (1977)
See DOUGLAS, supra note 52, at 48, 53.
See id.
See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Conservatism of Justice Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 33, 45–46 (1991).
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often take positions at odds with the understanding of the Founding Era,211 and for
good reason. Doing so enabled the Warren Court to end segregation and embrace
criminal justice reform.212 Justice Douglas’s tools of performing living
constitutionalism (penumbras rooted in the consciousness of the people and
changing the scope of intent) may be helpful for living constitutionalists. His
rationale for why such interpretation is legitimate may be less helpful. Yet, when
Justice Douglas’s theory is combined with Justice Brennan’s contemporary
ratification theory, Justice Douglas’s theory gains legitimacy. We need evolving
penumbras and changes of interpretive scope to account for communities ignored,
enslaved, or simply not present at the time of the Founding. For the Constitution to
retain validity, it must be continually ratified to fit contemporary society’s image,
and Douglas supplies further tools to do so.
V. OPERATIONALIZING THE THEMES OF THE WARREN COURT
Justice Scalia claimed that one needed a theory to beat a theory and that
living constitutionalism was merely a vague anti-originalism.213 Still, others
thought that living constitutionalism was a stand-in for the judiciary making things
up.214 This Article has looked at the work of three major Warren Court Justices:
Brennan, Warren, and Douglas. Justices Goldberg, Fortas, and Marshall are also
important contributors to the Warren Court’s living constitutionalist tradition.
After examining the Justices work, this Article posits that there are five major
tenets of Warren Court living constitutionalism that run throughout the Justices’
jurisprudence. These tenets give shape to living constitutionalism and stand as a
possible blueprint for future living constitutionalist judges. However, though living
constitutionalism is a coherent theory of interpretation, it is important to reject the
premise of Justice Scalia’s assertion. Proscriptive, empirical, and faux-objective
theories are inherently problematic, and one does not need a differing proscriptive,
empirical, and faux objective theory to “beat” a previous one.
A. The Five Tenets of the Warren Court’s Living Constitutionalism
The first tenet is that the Warren Court looked to protect those who lacked a
voice in our democracy. When interpreting the Constitution, the Warren Court often
considered the power dynamics of those involved. The Warren Court expanded the
rights of the accused,215 a group of Americans incredibly vulnerable to the whims of
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See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 182, at 37.
See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 67–68 (2018) (explaining that it would be hard to justify Mapp as an originalist opinion).
Scalia, supra note 1, at 855.
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND L.J. 1, 11–12 (1971).
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
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the majority.216 The Court defended a married couple’s right to privacy.217 The
Court protected communists’ First Amendment right to association.218 Further, the
Warren Court was quick to act in a countermajoritarian fashion when the
majoritarian machinery was the problem. In response to massive voting inequities
between rural and urban voters, the Warren Court established the principle of one
person, one vote in the cases of Baker and Reynolds.219 This was contrary to the
Founding Era’s understanding of constitutional construction. Yet, one person, one
vote is now considered to be a core principle of American constitutional law.220 This
is probably because the principles that the Constitution stands for work best in the
modern era within the one person, one vote system (the Founders had no idea how
large urban cities would be). Living constitutionalism interprets the Constitution
with the understanding that special attention needs to be paid when a certain group
has faced historical discrimination and/or has no access to economic, social, or
political influence.221
A second shared theme of the Warren Court is an understanding that, in
many respects, the Founding Fathers were flawed, not everyone was at the table
during the original ratification process, and that citizens ratify the Constitution
today in their own image.222 This ratification is constantly occurring. It happens
through political participation, jury duty, military service, charity, activism, state
government work, federal government work, and much more. How does one know
how the people ratify the Constitution in their own image? How do they actually do
the interpreting? One way is through the interpretation of super-statutes. Superstatutes can give great insight into how a new generation understands an old
provision.223 This does not mean super-statutes can decide constitutionality. They
reinforce and contribute to it. Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn explained that
often “the super-statute is one of the baselines against which other sources of law—
sometimes including the Constitution itself—are read.”224 Thus, the people of the
1960s ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in their image when they crystalized a
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See Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just Deserts: Criminal Law, Punishment
Rationales, and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 644–46 (2000) (discussing the relationship between
retributivism, criminality, and democracy).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967).
See J. DOUGLAS SMITH, ON DEMOCRACY’S DOORSTEP: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE SUPREME COURT BROUGHT
“ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE” TO THE UNITED STATES 3 (2014).
See David A. Strauss, Do We Have a Living Constitution?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 973, 974 (2011).
See Franciska Coleman, From Protection to Empowerment, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1879, 1882 (2021) (“[O]n one
side are those deeply invested in substantive fairness, such as proponents of living constitutionalism’s
minority protection model.”).
See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 91, at 438; STONE & STRAUSS, supra note 76, at 6.
An example being the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §1971 et seq. (1988); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 205, at 1216.
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new constitutional understanding through the Civil Rights Act.225 This was a
democratic process that fundamentally altered our accepted norms and relationship
to the Constitution: it was reratified with a new understanding.226
Another way to understand the Warren Court’s second theme is through the
“state laboratory” model. This model proposes that action on a state level can be a
great indicator of shifting moral winds.227 From Brown to Mapp, from the death
penalty to LGBTQ+ rights cases, the Court has consistently looked at state law or
legal interpretation as a benchmark for societal changes.228 The Court then applies
the new norm and forces the regressive holdout states to get on board. Further,
international custom and foreign policy concerns played a large role in Brown.229 In
today’s terms, if everyone around the world has condemned the death penalty, it
may be a sign to look inward and see if the American people have come to read the
Eighth Amendment differently. Lastly, a judge can look at the context of an issue—
how would a contemporary person understand a provision if they knew all the
contexts? State movement on a legal issue is certainly not necessary for a living
Constitution, but it can be a helpful tool in understanding legal evolution.
A third interpretive theme involves understanding the “intent” and “purpose”
of a provision at different levels of generality, depending on the case at hand. Often,
the Warren Court cared less about the particulars of what the Founders or
amendment writers literally thought about and more about the ethos of mischief
and context they were operating. For instance, it is unlikely that the writers of the
Fourteenth Amendment were thinking about the LGBTQ+ community. Yet, the
discrimination by those in power against a group that faced systematic oppression
was a major concern.230 Another example may be the debate over a colorblind
constitution. The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to make people
equal.231 But there is a strong argument that to truly have equality, we cannot
225
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Id. at 1237 (“[T]he Civil Rights Act is a proven super-statute because it embodies a great principle
(antidiscrimination), was adopted after an intense political struggle and normative debate and has over the
years entrenched its norm into American public life, and has pervasively affected federal statutes and
constitutional law.”).
See id. at 1237, 1240 (“[T]he Civil Rights Act has pervasively affected the evolution of public law.”).
See, e.g. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651–58 (1961).
See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, State Courts and Connotational Structure, 128 YALE L.J. 1304, 1311, 1317 (2019)
(writing a book review of JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS (2018)); Furman v. Ga, 408 U.S. 238,
277–78 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Glen Staszewski, Obergefell and Democracy, 97 B.U. L. REV. 31, 37
(2017); Greg Strauss, What’s Wrong with Obergefell, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 634 (2018).
See Jon Hanson & Jacob Lipton, Occupy Justice: Introducing the Injustice Framework and a Foreword, 15
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (2022 forthcoming) (explaining that America’s racism had become a national
embarrassment and an international liability); Anthony Lester, Brown v. Board of Education Overseas, 148
PROCE. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y. 455, 459 (2004) (“Although the Court's opinion in Brown made no reference
to these considerations of foreign policy, there is no doubt that they significantly influenced the decision.”).
See Brennan, supra note 91, at 433; Coleman, supra note 221; STONE & STRAUSS, supra note 76, at 25 (“The
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not believe they were outlawing school segregation, but they did
have a vision of equality, and the Warren Court carried forward that vision and adapted it for our time.”).
See Marshall, supra note 13 (“While the Union survived the civil war, the Constitution did not. In its place
arose a new, more promising basis for justice and equality, the 14th Amendment, ensuring protection of the
life, liberty, and property of all persons against deprivations without due process, and guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws.”).
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pretend to have colorblindness. Such colorblindness is not helpful to the goals of the
Fourteenth Amendment.232 This is a combination of history and intent at a
generality that makes it workable and effective in a modern era. The right to
equality is still there, but we have a new idea of what equality means and how we
get there. As to what level of generality to choose, a Court could look at what level
would faithfully align the intent of the clause with the realities of the modern world,
what level would include communities previously left out of the constitutional
framing, or what level of generality is chosen by most state courts.
The fourth pillar of the Warren Court’s interpretive theory is pragmatism.
This is somewhat derived from the above themes—the need to make the
Constitution “work” in a modern society. Judicial pragmatism can take many forms.
One form of outcome-driven pragmatism is concerned with making the law actually
function in modern society.233 It is less about modern morals and more about
modern innovations in technology or how we communicate. Another form of
pragmatism focuses on valid considerations of the political capital possessed by the
Court and the judicial competency of the Court.234 Living constitutionalist theory
incorporates such concerns into how we read the Constitution.
Lastly, the fifth pillar of the Warren Court’s living constitutionalism did not
ignore history, precedent, and text. They were an important part of the balancing
test and should be a sizable part of most living constitutionalist approaches, just not
the only part.235 Further, precedent acts as an important restraint on the judiciary,
and living constitutionalists often respect precedent as a part of the evolutionary
constitutional system.236
B. Counterarguments
Disagreements with this Article’s thesis may take three forms: one can
criticize as an originalist, one can criticize as an advocate of judicial restraint more
generally, and one can criticize as a historian. This Part will focus on the first two
criticisms. Both can argue that the paper has not accurately interpreted the Warren
Court’s analysis. Critics of the latter interpretation may be joined by members of
the Warren Court who would disagree with this Article’s assessment of their
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See Dennis Parker, The 14th Amendment Was Intended to Achieve Racial Justice – And We Must Keep It
That Way, ACLU (July 9, 2018, 5:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/race-and-inequalityeducation/14th-amendment-was-intended-achieve-racial-justice (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment was never
a colorblind document. The amendment was enacted specifically for purposes of assisting newly freed Black
people.”).
See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, A Conservative House United: How the Post-Warren Court Dismantled the
Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L 475, 477, 497–99 (2013).
See e.g., Gregory S. Chernack, The Clash of Two Worlds: Justice Robert H. Jackson, Institutional
Pragmatism, and Brown, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 51, 53 (1999).
See Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 358 (2007)
(explaining that living constitutionalism looks at history as part of a larger “motley constellation” of
interpretation but that living constitutionalism does not “privilege history”).
STONE & STRAUSS, supra note 76, at 24, 60.
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jurisprudence. Particularly, Justice Douglas may take issue with this Article’s
categorization of his interpretation.
Originalist opponents of living constitutionalism have argued and will argue
that this theory is ripe for abuse. Their argument takes two major forms: (1) that
living constitutionalism is illegitimate and (2) that it is unworkable.237 The second
deserves further attention, as the first has been largely addressed throughout the
Article. Originalists will say that judges can just shift the generality (or scope) to
the exact point where they get the result they want.238 Imagine conservatives doing
this with corporate donations, gerrymandering, or civil rights. In fact, this will be,
and has been, a chief criticism of all forms of living constitutionalism.239 They will
allege that a judge could interpret contemporary ratification to mean whatever they
want it to mean.240 The Warren Court cited trends in state movement in Mapp241
and Gideon v. Wainwright.242 Yet, the movement for Mapp was not sweeping. About
half the states had an exclusionary rule, and many of the states had that rule
imposed by the state judiciary.243 State trends are thus not constraining and do
little actual work in interpretive philosophy. The themes of the Warren Court’s
living constitutionalism may just be rationales for already decided outcomes. One
could argue that if the above analysis is the case, then Justice Scalia was right.
There is no real theory here. Even if it is true that there are cohesive themes that
run through living constitutionalism, they are shared themes for judicial fiat.
Further, even if the law involves understanding the evolving standards of
decency, do we really want the Court making that call? Chief Justice Warren
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See Scalia, supra note 1, at 855; Richard F. Duncan, Justice Scalia and the Rule of Law: Originalism vs. the
Living Constitution, 29 REGENT U.L. REV. 9, 11 (2016); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 703–06 (1976).
The power of extreme generalization was demonstrated by Justice William O. Douglas
in Griswold v. Connecticut. In Griswold the Court struck down Connecticut's
anticontraception statute. Justice Douglas created a constitutional right of privacy that
invalidated the state's law against the use of contraceptives. He observed that many
provisions of the Bill of Rights could be viewed as protections of aspects of personal
privacy. He then generalized these particulars into an overall right of privacy that
applies even where no provision of the Bill of Rights does. By choosing that level of
abstraction, the Bill of Rights was expanded beyond the known intentions of the
Framers.
See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN. D. L. REV. 823,
828 (1986) See also Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57
CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (discussing Justice Scalia’s views on generality).
The criticism that judges can inject their values by changing scope is also one of the major criticisms of
originalism. See, e.g., id, at 1062–63; Lino A Graglia, “Interpreting” The Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44,
STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1044 (1992); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1918 n.94 (1995).
See Duncan, supra note 237, at 11 (“The so-called Living Constitution is not law but rather clay in the
hands of Justices who shape it to mean whatever they believe it ‘ought to mean.’”) (emphasis in original)
(quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 39 (1997)).
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 (1960)).
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
See Liu, supra note 228, at 1317.
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advocated for Japanese internment during his time in California politics.244 And
Justice Hugo Black had previous ties to the Ku Klux Klan.245 One may wonder why
their opinions on decency count. In fact, it is living constitutionalists that often
argue that all judges are inherently infallible and that pretending judges simply
call “balls and strikes” is misleading.246 It may seem logically inconsistent for
someone to argue that judges are flawed and that they should determine whether
the Constitution has evolved. Originalists and judicial minimalists may argue that
while legislators retain the same imperfections, there are at least more legislators
and realistic ways of getting rid of them. A judicial minimalist may agree with
many living constitutionalist premises but view them as a good reason for less
judicial review. The argument goes that if the Constitution does evolve, then the
process of evolution belongs in the peoples’ elected representatives.
There are generally three responses this Article provides, as informed by the
Warren Court’s jurisprudence: (1) living constitutionalism supports democratic
principles; (2) living constitutionalism at times does not support majority rule and
that is okay; and (3) even if the above arguments are unpersuasive, they are better
than the alternative. The first is the hardest to support—is the Court a democratic
instrument? To begin, it is important to note that living constitutionalism is not
only for the federal bench. It is a theory that has, and should be, applied by state
courts, many of whom are elected.247 In fact, Justice Brennan argued that more
attention should be given to how state courts read their constitution.248 Regarding
the federal bench, it would be an exaggeration to suggest there is no democratic
function whatsoever. Judges are selected by the democratically elected President
and affirmed by the democratically elected Senate. It would also be wrong to
suggest that courts are unaccountable to the people. The Supreme Court is
constantly looking for middle ground, preserving capital, and adapting to political
pressures.249 There are many instances of the Court retreating after political
pushback.250 As to the theory itself, aspects of living constitutionalism are
concerned with taking the temperature of society. And, as mentioned previously,
living constitutionalism brings communities into the constitutional fold that were
previously left out. Often, living constitutionalism can allow courts to fight Congress
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in a manner that preserves democracy.251 There is also little evidence to suggest
that living constitutionalist courts invalidate congressional laws more than other
courts.252 In fact, living constitutionalist opinions may influence the legislature to
take the issue more seriously and expand upon the court’s decisions, thus igniting
the democratic process on key issues.253 Lastly, while the Court is not a perfect
democratic institution, neither are the legislative or executive branches, which each
possess numerous problems, from gerrymandering to the electoral college.
There are times, however, where the Court should not be interested in
majority rule. It should be focused on dignity. The Warren Court’s justices were
living during a time of segregation. Racist southern legislatures and federal
politicians were blocking and harassing the civil rights movement.254 The powerful
majority was looking to subjugate the minority and use democratic institutions to
do it. The progressive justices understood that there was a certain dignity in the
Constitution that transcended the political branches.255 Majority rule can be at odds
with constitutional dignity. It was hard to trust the political branches to fix a
problem when access to the political branches was the problem itself. Someone
needed to protect the constitutional rights of the Brown family when it was clear
there was no legislative appetite to do so. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky wrote in
defense of judicial review:
[Many] times there is the tyranny of the majority. Laws enforcing
segregation existed throughout the South and likely would have
lasted long beyond their invalidation by the Supreme Court if it had
been left to the political process. Throughout history, majorities have
persecuted racial, religious, and political minorities. This, too, is
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(citations omitted).
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popular constitutionalism, but hardly the one that any of us want to
preserve.256
The Constitution serves many important functions. One of those functions is to
highlight a group of rights that are not subject to the majority’s whims—to protect
the minority from majority rule.257 It is the Court’s job to understand these rights
and to make them adaptable to the modern era. As Justice Brennan noted, to not do
so is a political choice in itself, one against the creation of unenumerated rights.258
It is the job of living constitutionalism to see new and modern threats to the dignity
of the minority and address them adequately.259
The last and perhaps easiest way to defend living constitutionalism from
critique is that—while it is not perfect—it is better than the other options.
Originalism and the theory of judicial restraint involve courts making political
decisions. There is no one way to be an originalist, and thus, it is possible
originalism to come to differing conclusions. District of Columbia v. Heller260 is a
famous example of this problem. The same theory was used on the same fact
pattern,261 yet originalism allowed the liberal judge to rule in a liberal way and the
conservative judge to rule in a conservative way.262 This is a problem for a theory
that maintains to be objective and predictable. A judge can use whichever form of
originalist theory gets them to their preferred destination. Worse still, judges using
the same form of originalism can come to different conclusions on the same case,
often along party lines.263 When originalist judges include subjectivity, it is hidden.
Of course, living constitutionalism absolutely is prone to judicial values. This is not
a judge doing whatever they want. Rather, living constitutionalism is susceptible to
judges making subconscious decisions because of deep-rooted values. Something can
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be both subjective and legitimate.264 Judges are supposed to use discretion and their
best judgment in solving controversies. The Constitution as a document is political
in the sense that it distributes power and defines rights. Suppose, however, as
many do, that the idea of an objective judiciary is desirable. Living
constitutionalism is preferable in such a scenario to that of originalism because,
unlike living constitutionalism, originalism allows a judge to bring values into a
case while purporting to be objective.265 There is less judicial accountability because
the values are hidden behind the suggested Founders’ intent.266 In this way,
originalism is just as activist as the Warren Court’s living constitutionalism but far
less transparent. To play off of a famous Scalia phrase, originalism is the wolf that
comes as a sheep.267
If both sides of the debate are open to judicial subjectivity, it is far more
preferable to adopt the one that is transparent. While almost all living
constitutionalists insist that they are not turning the judiciary into a legislative
body or imbuing their own policy preferences into law, when they do, they can be
called out on it. Justice Brennan wrote that a core aspect of his interpretive theory
was that it was public.268 When a living constitutionalist justice attempts to
interpret evolving standards of decency, they do this by following the themes
outlined in this Article. But they never pretend it is an exact science. They never
suggest that “decency” or “dignity” are not value judgments. They are. But by
adopting an interpretive theory that understands the law cannot be some sort of
machine—plug a question into the originalist meter and the answer comes out—
they open themselves up to public accountability.269 Legislatures, the president,
fellow judges, the press, and the people can all follow along. They can locate when
and where value judgments must be made and respond accordingly.270 No such
process can happen with originalism. The judicial value judgments are hidden
behind a sheen of objectivity; they are lost amongst the history of the Founders.
Justice Brennan wrote, “while proponents of this facile historicism justify it as a
depoliticization of the judiciary, the political underpinnings of such a choice should
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not escape notice.”271 Contrary to the claims of originalists, political judgments are
as essential in originalism as they are in living constitutionalism.272
And while the dead hand problems of originalism have been discussed by
legal scholars at length, it should be noted here that even if originalism was a value
free interpretive theory, it would still suffer major defects: it leads to unworkable
and often heinous outcomes.273 It is clear that the writers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not intend for the Amendment to forbid a ban on gay marriage. But
we live in a society far different than that of those Amendment writers. We have
different values, understandings, and practices; originalism suffers from the dead
hand problem in a way living constitutionalism does not.274 A rigid historical test
does a disservice to our Constitution as a forward-looking document. Justice John
Paul Stevens—who did not serve on the Warren Court but served with Justices
Brennan and Marshall and adopted many aspects of the Warren Court’s living
constitutionalism—summarized this flaw of originalism when he wrote:
For if it were really the case that the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of liberty embraces only those rights “so
rooted in our history, tradition, and practice as to require special
protection,” then the guarantee would serve little function, save to
ratify those rights that state actors have already been according the
most extensive protection. That approach is unfaithful to the
expansive principle Americans laid down when they ratified
the Fourteenth Amendment and to the level of generality they chose
when they crafted its language; it promises an objectivity it cannot
deliver and masks the value judgments that pervade any analysis of
what customs, defined in what manner, are sufficiently “'rooted'”; it
countenances the most revolting injustices in the name of continuity,
for we must never forget that not only slavery but also the subjugation
of women and other rank forms of discrimination are part of our
history . . . .275
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Even this critique of originalism is charitable because it assumes that the
Constitution was a legitimate democratic document at the time of writing. There is
a strong argument that the Constitution had legitimacy flaws from the start—only
by adding new voices to the constitutional process can the Constitution begin to
gain legitimacy.276
Justice Scalia said, “[y]ou can’t beat somebody with nobody.”277 This Article
is a direct response to the idea that there is no coherent alternative to originalism.
The Warren Court provides a strong example of how identified, broad, and shared
themes lead to a dignified understanding of constitutional law. It has identified
broad and shared themes, not a proscriptive equation.
All interpretive theories share certain imperfections. Originalism’s claim that
it lacks these imperfections while attempting to criticize living constitutionalism
has been consistently called out.278 If having many sources or being prone to judicial
subjectivity makes living constitutionalism an incoherent theory, then originalism
must be considered a “nobody” as well.
C. The Impact of the Warren Court’s Living Constitutionalism
This Article has focused on demonstrating that the Warren Court had a
cohesive living constitutionalist theory by showing where and when such a theory
occurred. Perhaps, it is better to articulate living constitutionalism’s contribution by
discussing what would have happened had the theory not occurred. History is not
inevitable. As demonstrated in the previous analysis on Brown, the Court was very
close to ruling the other way.279 The fundamental one person, one vote standard we
take for granted today was inconceivable in the nineteenth century.280 Without
living constitutionalism, the world would look quite different.
The Founding Fathers almost certainly did not believe that segregation
would be anything close to unconstitutional.281 The Fourteenth Amendment writers
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did not anticipate it either.282 Living constitutionalism was necessary for Brown;
the Court made this explicit when it said that it must “consider public education in
the light of its full development and its present place in American life.”283 According
to the Court, living constitutionalism is the only way this equal protection claim
could be determined.284 While many originalist scholars have tried to rationalize
Brown with originalism, still more show how they are inherently inconsistent.285
Further, originalism’s beginning can be traced back to the fight against Brown.286 It
was, in some respects, an interpretive method created to rationalize segregation.
Without living constitutionalism, there is no Brown.287 There is no equal right to
have a vote counted.288 The Founders did not have the same conception of privacy
rights.289 There is certainly no exclusionary rule; the Founders ignored such a
formulation.290 Americans of different racial and ethnic backgrounds would not
have the fundamental right to marry each other; the Founders would have recoiled
at the suggestion.291 Without living constitutionalism, it would be hard to justify
banning the death penalty for minors based on original intent. Minors were
executed in the Founding Era.292 Our society changes. Justice Thurgood Marshall,
speaking against originalism, wrote, “we must be careful, when focusing on the
events which took place in Philadelphia two centuries ago, that we not overlook the
momentous events which followed, and thereby lose our proper sense of
perspective.”293
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states have been free to choose from a number of differing apportionment systems, many of which did not
abide by modern one person, one vote standard).
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Without living constitutionalism, there is no Justice Marshall. He reflected
that “[t]he men who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 . . . could not have imagined,
nor would they have accepted, that the document they were drafting would one day
be construed by a Supreme Court to which had been appointed a woman and the
descendant of an African slave.”294 The Founding Fathers—and largely the
Fourteenth Amendment writers—thought that having Justice Marshall at school,
the counter, or the Court would challenge white supremacy.295 For some, living
constitutionalism is an intellectual exercise, playful banter between elite lawyers as
to the role of the Founding Fathers. To Justice Marshall and many more, living
constitutionalism was about constitutional freedom.
This Article has alluded to the necessity of judicial review to protect civil
rights; it is highly unlikely that the legislature would have been able to end legal
segregation in the 1950s.296 Suppose, however, that this view is incorrect and the
Warren Court did not need to adopt living constitutionalism as a tool for judicial
review because the legislature would have ended segregation by itself.297 In this
scenario, living constitutionalism is still an important component of desegregation
(or whichever issue Congress is addressing as opposed to the Court). When
Congress understands that segregation is antithetical to our constitutional and
social order, adopts that purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and applies it to
modern contexts, and inextricably ties a legislative remedy to a constitutional right,
Congress is doing living constitutionalism. And remember, one of the major
premises of the Warren Court’s living constitutionalism is that the Court is not the
only body that interprets the Constitution. This constant ratification of our
governing principles among the populace has been occurring for a long time,298 and
it has been a critical force in recognizing the rights and dignity of all Americans.
CONCLUSION
The Warren Court utilized living constitutionalism in many important cases.
Out of these cases arose living constitutionalist themes and tenets which suggest a
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cohesive interpretive theory of the Constitution. The Warren Court’s theory of living
constitutionalism is just as much a theory of interpretation as originalism; in fact, it
should be preferred. This is not to say that the Warren Court’s living
constitutionalism should be applied today in full. It should be understood as
complementing modern legal movements. The living constitutionalism of the
twenty-first century will, by definition, look different than it did in the 1960s; the
justices were products of their era and often moved slowly, or incorrectly, on a
variety of issues. However, without the tenets of the Warren Court’s living
constitutionalism, our society would be far more cruel, apathetic, and unjust.
Justice Scalia believed that you cannot beat something with nothing. Living
constitutionalism is a powerful something.

